
About the Games, Agents, and Incentives Workshop
We invite submissions to the 8th iteration of the Games, Agents and Incentives Workshop, co-located with AAMAS 2026 in Paphos, Cyprus.
Games, Agents and Incentives is a confederated workshop which focuses (obviously…) on agents and incentives in AI. In particular on game theory (cooperative and non-cooperative), social choice, and agent-mediated e-commerce aspects of AI systems. The confederated workshop merges multiple workshops that have been associated with AAMAS in the past, which considered different aspects of the general interplay between AI and economics:
- CoopMAS: Cooperative Games in Multi-agent Systems
- AMEC: Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce
- EXPLORE: Exploring Beyond the Worst Case in Computational Social Choice
Over the past two decades, the focus of agent incentives in centralised and decentralised AI systems has increased dramatically. These issues come up when designing preference aggregation mechanisms and markets; computing equilibria and bidding strategies; facilitating cooperation among agents; and fairly dividing resources.
Important Dates
- Submission Deadline: February 4, 2026 (AoE) (Link)
- Acceptance Notification: March 20, 2026
- Camera Ready: TBD (AoE)
- AAMAS Conference: May 25 - May 29, 2026
- GAIW Workshop: May 26, 2026
Important Links:
- GAIW 2026 Submission Link
- AAMAS 2026 Conference Website
- 7th GAIW Website (2025)
- 6th GAIW Website (2024)
- 5th GAIW Website (2023)
- GAIW 2022 Program Recording
- 4th GAIW Website (2022)
- 3rd GAIW Website (2021)
- 2nd GAIW Website (2020)
- 1st GAIW Website (2019)
About GAIW
The focus on games, agents, and incentives in AI venues (including AAMAS, AAAI, & IJCAI) can be judged from the significant proportion of technical program sessions which deal with “economic paradigms”; “mathematical social sciences”; “auctions and markets”; “non-cooperative games”; “cooperative games”; “social choice”. One goal of the workshop is to provide a forum to present the latest research, including research that can benefit from further discussion and feedback. The workshop’s goal is to bring together researchers in the fields related to algorithmic mechanism design, computational social choice, and fair division while providing a platform for cross-fertilization of ideas between junior and senior researchers in these fields.
The workshop fits the type of research valued by the AI and agents communities. In the last 30 years, 9 of the 22 winners of the IJCAI Computer and Thought Award worked on topics in the intersection of AI and economics/agents: specifically, Sarit Kraus (1995), Nicholas Jennings (1999), Tuomas Sandholm (2003), Peter Stone (2007), Carlos Guestrin (2009), Vincent Conitzer (2011), Ariel Procaccia (2015), and Piotr Skowron (2020), Nisarg Shah (2024). Similarly, 12 of the 18 awardees of the Victor Lesser IFAAMAS Distinguished Dissertation Award work on topics in this strategic intersection: Vincent Conitzer (2006), Radu Jurca (2007), Ariel Procaccia (2008), Andrew Gilpin (2009), Bo An (2010), Manish Jain (2013), Yair Zick (2014), Nisarg Shah (2016), and Dominik Peters (2020) (we note that Dr. Haifeng Xu was a runner-up for the award in 2019), Noam Brown (2020), Bryan Wilder (2021), and Niclas Boehmer (2023).
Papers will be invited under the following topics:
- Agentic AI systems
- Algorithmic mechanism design
- Auctions
- Behavioral Game Theory
- Bounded rationality
- Cooperative Games
- Computational advertising
- Computational aspects of equilibria
- Computational social choice
- Coalitions, coordination, collective action, and cooperation
- Economic aspects of security and privacy
- Economic aspects of distributed and network computing
- Equilibrium computation
- Empirical approaches to e-markets
- Fairness (in ML & elsewhere)
- Fair Division
- Incentives in machine learning
- Information and attention economics
- Learning in games (e.g., solution concepts and equilibria)
- Matching and Matching Markets
- Negotiation
- Preference aggregation and reasoning
- Price differentiation and price dynamics
- Social networks
- Trading agent design and analysis
- Uncertainty in AI and economics