The 8th Games, Agents, and Incentives workshop will be held at AAMAS 2026 in the room Akamas B.
Overview
| Time | Session | Topic | Structure |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8:45-9:30 | Keynote - Piotr Faliszewski | Algorithms for Generating (Interesting) Elections | |
| 9:30-10:15 | Session 1 - Talks | ML, RL, LLMs, Agent-Based Modeling | 5x Short + 1x Long |
| 10:15-11:00 | Coffee Break | Coffee + Poster Session | |
| 11:00-11:30 | Session 2 - Talks | Game Theory | 5x Short |
| 11:30-12:30 | Session 3 - Talks | Voting | 3x Short + 3x Long |
| 12:30-14:00 | Lunch | ||
| 14:00-14:45 | Session 4 | Allocations | 3x Short + 1x Long |
| 14:45-15:30 | Online Session | Online Session | 8x Short |
| 15:30-16:15 | Coffee Break | Coffee + Poster Session | |
| 16:15-17:00 | Session 5 | Voting | 6x Short + 1x Long |
| 17:00-17:45 | Poster Session |
Keynote - Algorithms for Generating (Interesting) Elections
Speaker: Piotr Faliszewski
Abstract: In this talk I will present a research program whose goal is to develop methods for generating useful preference data (or, in other words, elections). Currently, researchers have two options when looking for data. Either they can use very simplistic statistical cultures, such as impartial culture, Polya-Eggenberger urn model, or the Mallows model, or they can use real-life data. The problem with using the former is that basic models “obviously” do not lead to realistic data. The problem with the latter approach is that we have very limited control over such data (in terms of, e.g., choosing the number of candidates and voters) and, worse yet, real-life data is not as real as we would like. By that I mean that it rarely truly comes exactly from the setting that we want to consider (think of using election from a political election carried out using STV to model a small-scale election in an institution, using Borda rule). In this research program I propose two main tasks: First, we should develop our understanding of data, by designing a broad family of so-called “election indices”. An election index is a function that returns a value in the range between 0 and 1, indicating to what extent an election has a certain feature (such as, e.g., being polarized). The second task regards algorithms for generating elections with given features. While one approach is to try to make these generating elections realistic–e.g., by developing and learning more advanced statistical cultures—it suffices to make them “interesting”: For example, if we are interested in evaluating a running time of an algorithm, we might want data on which it is slow. If we are interested in elections that appear in particular real-life settings, we might want data with the same values of election indices as the elections that arise there.
Detailed Schedule
| Time | Title | Authors | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8:45-9:30 | Invited Talk - Piotr Faliszewski | Algorithms for Generating (Interesting) Elections | |
| Session 1: ML, RL, LLMs, Agent-Based Modeling | |||
| 9:30-9:45 | From Competition to Collaboration: Designing Sustainable Mechanisms Between LLMs and Online Forums | Yftah Ziser, Omer Ben-Porat, Niv Fono | |
| 9:45-9:50 | Deep Incentive Design with Differentiable Equilibrium Blocks | Luke Marris, Georgios Piliouras, Vinzenz Thoma | |
| 9:50-9:55 | Reinforcement Learning for Automated Negotiation | Yasser Mohammad | |
| 9:55-10:00 | Strategic Content Creation with GenAI: To Share or Not to Share? | Omer Ben-Porat, Gur Keinan | |
| 10:00-10:05 | Identifying Latent Intentions via Inverse Reinforcement Learning in Repeated Linear Public Good Games | Christoph Engel, Marcel Schubert, Carina I Hausladen | |
| 10:05-10:10 | Extrapolating Volition with Recursive Information Markets | Long Tran-Thanh, Abhimanyu Pallavi Sudhir | |
| 10:15-11:00 | Coffee Break + Poster Session | ||
| Session 2: Game Theory | |||
| 11:00-11:05 | Individual Rationality in Constrained Hedonic Games: Anonymous and Diversity Preferences | Šimon Schierreich, Nikolaos Melissinos, Harmender Gahlawat, Foivos Fioravantes | |
| 11:05-11:10 | The Power of Matching for Online Fractional Hedonic Games | Alexander Schlenga, René Romen, Martin Bullinger | |
| 11:10-11:15 | Shapley Value-based Approach for Redistributing Revenue of Matchmaking of Private Transactions in Blockchains | Sujit Gujar, Yash Chaurasia, Parth Desai, Rasheed M | |
| 11:15-11:20 | Equilibria of the Colonel Blotto Games with Costs | Stanisław Kaźmierowski | |
| 11:20-11:25 | Expanding and Evaluating the Applicability of Safe Pareto Improvements | Caspar Oesterheld, Nathaniel Sauerberg | |
| Session 3: Voting | |||
| 11:30-11:45 | On Nash Equilibria in Participatory Budgeting with Donations and Beyond | Krzysztof Rogowski, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Georgios Papasotiropoulos, Grzegorz Lisowski | |
| 11:45-12:00 | Prospect-Theoretic Voting: Strategic Implications and Computational Limits | Maria Polukarov, Bart De Keijzer, Colin Cleveland | |
| 12:00-12:05 | Simple Budgeting Games | Maria Polukarov, Svetlana Obraztsova, Bart De Keijzer, Alexander Konev, Benjamin Yu | |
| 12:05-12:10 | How Many Votes Is a Lie Worth? Measuring Strategyproofness through Resource Augmentation | Caspar Oesterheld, Jiayuan Liu, Eden Hartman, Vincent Conitzer, Ratip Emin Berker | |
| 12:10-12:15 | Costly Voting in the Hotelling-Downs Model | Reshef Meir, Guy Wolf | |
| 12:15-12:30 | Strategic Merging of Project Proposals in Participatory Budgeting | Zein Pishbin, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Grzegorz Lisowski, Łukasz Janeczko, Piotr Faliszewski | |
| 12:30-14:00 | Lunch | ||
| Session 4: Allocations | |||
| 14:00-14:15 | Fair Allocation of Improvements: When Old Endowments Shape New Assignments | Erel Segal-Halevi, Rica Gonen, Noga Klein Elmalem | |
| 14:15-14:20 | On the Fairness of Additive Welfarist Rules | Sheung Man Yuen, Warut Suksompong, Karen Frilya Celine | |
| 14:20-14:25 | Online EFX Allocations with Predictions | Nicos Protopapas, Themistoklis Melissourgos | |
| 14:25-14:30 | Almost Equitable Allocations of Indivisible Goods under Externalities | Aditi Sethia, Manisha Padala, Neeldhara Misra | |
| Online Session | |||
| 14:45-14:50 | Reforming an Unfair Allocation by Exchanging Goods | Warut Suksompong, Naoyuki Kamiyama, Ayumi Igarashi, Sheung Man Yuen | |
| 14:50-14:55 | Non-Monotonicity in Fair Division of Graphs | Yu Zhou, Shraddha Pathak, Hadi Hosseini | |
| 14:55-15:00 | How Preference Structure Affects Manipulability in Matching Markets | Shraddha Pathak, Anna Kasehagen, Hadi Hosseini | |
| 15:00-15:05 | Credit Fairness: Online Fairness In Shared Resource Pools | Rupert Freeman, Seyed Majid Zahedi | |
| 15:05-15:10 | Social Welfare in Budget Aggregation | Markus Utke, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Rupert Freeman, Javier Cembrano | |
| 15:10-15:15 | Weighted Soft Condorcet Optimization | Santeri Koivula | |
| 15:15-15:20 | PeerBTS: Incentivizing Effort in Strategyproof Peer Selection | Nicholas Mattei, Omer Lev, Harper Lyon | |
| 15:20-15:25 | Analyzing the Effects of Two-Stage Peer Evaluation | Kobi Gal, Nicholas Mattei, Omer Lev, Oshri Damty, Harper Lyon, Roy Fairstein | |
| 15:30-16:15 | Coffee Break + Poster Session | ||
| Session 5: Voting | |||
| 16:15-16:30 | Representation in Peer Selection: A Liquid Democracy Perspective | Georgios Papasotiropoulos, Grzegorz Lisowski, Davide Grossi | |
| 16:30-16:35 | Bucklin and Condorcet Consistency of Dynamic Voting | Alan Tsang, Zinovi Rabinovich, Maria Polukarov, Svetlana Obraztsova, Edith Elkind | |
| 16:35-16:40 | Is Four Enough? Automated Reasoning Approaches and Dual Bounds for Condorcet Dimensions of Elections | Ruben Martins, George Zhaoqi Li, Ratip Emin Berker, Itai Zilberstein | |
| 16:40-16:45 | Algorithms for Structured Elections under Thiele Voting Rules | Krzysztof Sornat, Alexandra Anna Lassota | |
| 16:45-16:50 | What Are People’s Actual Utility Functions in Budget Aggregation? | Erel Segal-Halevi, Rica Gonen, Lioz Akirav, Ayelet Amster | |
| 16:50-16:55 | Aggregating Rankings from Heterogeneous Voters | Reshef Meir, Doron Kabla | |
| 16:55-17:00 | Optimized Distortion in Linear Social Choice | Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Luise Ge, Gregory Kehne | |
| 17:00-17:45 | Poster Session |